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ABSTRACT
Many analysis and machine learning tasks require the availability
of marginal statistics on multidimensional datasets while providing
strong privacy guarantees for the data subjects. Applications for
these statistics range from finding correlations in the data to fitting
sophisticated prediction models. In this paper, we provide a set
of algorithms for materializing marginal statistics under the strong
model of local differential privacy. We prove the first tight theo-
retical bounds on the accuracy of marginals compiled under each
approach, perform empirical evaluation to confirm these bounds,
and evaluate them for tasks such as modeling and correlation test-
ing. Our results show that releasing information based on (local)
Fourier transformations of the input is preferable to alternatives
based directly on (local) marginals.
1. INTRODUCTION
Modern data-driven applications must guarantee a high level of
privacy to their users if they are to gain widespread acceptance. The
current de facto standard for privacy is differential privacy, which
imposes a statistical requirement on the output of a data release
process. Considerable effort has been invested into achieving this
guarantee while maximizing the fidelity of the released informa-
tion, typically with the assistance of a centralized trusted third party
who aggregates the data. However, there is growing importance
placed on algorithms which dispense with the trusted aggregator,
and instead allow each participant to ensure that the information
that they reveal already meets the differential privacy guarantee in
isolation. This gives the local differential privacy (LDP) model.
The model of Local Differential Privacy combines the statistical
guarantees of differential privacy with a further promise to the user:
their information is never visible to anyone else in its raw form, and
they retain “plausible deniability” of any sensitive information as-
sociated with them. Local differential privacy has been adopted
in Google Chrome via the RAPPOR tool to collect browing and
system statistics [13], and in Apple’s iOS 10 to collect app usage
statistics [14]. It is consequently already deployed for information
gathering over a user base of hundreds of millions of people. So far,
.
User/Preferences Action Romance Comedy Crime
Alice Y N N Y
Bob N Y Y N
...
...
...
...
...
Zayn Y N Y N
Figure 1: User Preferences
Animation/Musical Y N
Y 0.55 0.15
N 0.10 0.20
Figure 2: 2-way marginal
work in the LDP model has focused on relatively simple computa-
tions: collecting basic frequency statistics about one dimensional
data (e.g. identifying popular destinations on the web). But this
one-dimensional view of the world does not capture the rich set of
correlations that real data exhibits. The following case study gives
some examples.
Motivating example: video viewing data. Consider collecting
data on video views from a large user base. Online video viewing
habits should be considered very private, as personal preferences
can reveal highly sensitive information about an individual’s views
on politics, religion and sexuality. There is considerable precedent
for considering such information in need of protection, from the US
Video privacy protection act, to the debate around the data released
as part of the Netflix Prize [28]. Figure 1 shows an example data
set in the context of video preferences, where each user is described
in terms of a number of (binary) attributes, capturing which genres
they have expressed interest in.
There are many potential uses of this kind of data when it is
represented as statistical marginal tables. Put simply, a marginal
table records the (empirical) probability distribution between a set
of attributes. A video service provider could learn which individual
genres are more or less popular within this user population. They
could also understand which combinations of genres are jointly
popular, to guide the procurement and promotion of new content
— for example, generally, do viewers interested in watching ani-
mated movies also watch musicals? We would also want to test the
validity of any correlations found by subjecting them to statistical
hypothesis tests. Beyond just finding correlations, we may be inter-
ested in more complex analysis such as describing the probabilistic
relationship between cause and effects by modeling features as a
Bayesian Network. Such graphical models rely on the computation
of conditional probability tables (CPTs), which are derived directly
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from marginals. Lastly, one could seek to design recommender sys-
tems based on the correlations in the data: since you enjoyed these
types of movie, we think you’ll enjoy this one. All these tasks can be
accomplished given information about the population-level corre-
lations between particular combinations of attributes, which can be
derived from the marginal distributions between small numbers of
attributes–typically, two-way or three-way marginals suffice. Fig-
ure 2 shows a marginal table between musicals and animated films,
which shows a correlation between the categories. Consequently,
our objective is to allow such tables to be computed accurately
on demand from data collected privately from a large user popu-
lation.
Thus the contingency, or marginal, table is the workhorse of data
analysis. These statistics are important in and of themselves for un-
derstanding the data distribution, and identifying which attributes
are correlated. They are also used for query planning and approx-
imate query answering within database systems. Statistical infer-
ence and machine learning also rely on accurate marginals captur-
ing the correlations. Consequently, almost any modern study of
data requires the use of (low order) marginals at some level. So, we
target low-order 2-way and 3-way marginals as our main focus.
It is therefore not surprising that much work on private data
analysis has studied the problem of materializing and releasing
marginals while achieving some privacy guarantee. It is clear that
the information described by marginals is potentially very sensi-
tive, as it collates and reveals information about individuals. A
canonical example of privacy leakage is when a cell in a marginal
table refers to just one person or a few individuals, and allows the
value of an attribute to be inferred. For instance, a marginal table
relating salary and zip code can reveal an individual’s income level
when they are the sole high earner in a region. While this problem
has been well-studied under centralized differential privacy, there is
limited prior work that applies in the local DP model for two-way
marginals [16]; in this paper, we seek to give strong guarantees for
arbitrary marginals.
Our Contributions. In this work, we provide a general frame-
work for marginal release under LDP, with theoretical and empir-
ical analysis. First, we review prior work (Section 2), and pro-
vide background on methods to support private marginal release
(Section 3). We describe a set of new algorithms that give unbi-
ased estimators for marginals, which vary on fundamental design
choices such as whether to release information about each marginal
in turn, or about the whole joint distribution; and whether to re-
lease statistics directly about the tables, or to give derived statistics
based on (Fourier) transforms of the data. For each combination,
we argue that it meets the LDP guarantee, and provide an accuracy
guarantee in terms of the privacy parameter , population size N ,
and also the dimensionality of the data, d, and target marginals, k
(Section 4). We perform experimental comparison to augment the
theoretical understanding in Section 5, focusing mostly on the low-
degree marginals that are of most value. Across a range of data
dimensionalities and marginal sizes, the most effective techniques
are based on working in the Fourier (Hadamard) transform space,
which capture more information per user than methods working di-
rectly in the data space. The use of Hadamard transform for mate-
rializing marginals was considered by early work in the centralized
differential privacy model, but has fallen from favor in the central-
ized model, supplanted by more involved privacy mechanisms [7,
19, 34]. We observe that these other mechanisms do not easily
translate to the local model. However, methods involving the linear
(Hadamard) transformation do so more smoothly, yielding effec-
tive LDP protocols; our contribution here is in adapting, analyzing,
and evaluating this approach in the local model. The endpoint of
our evaluation is the application of our methods to two use-cases:
building a Bayesian model of the data, and testing statistical signifi-
cance of correlations. These confirm that in practice the Hadamard-
based approach is preferable and the most scalable. Our methods
are eminently suitable for implementation in existing LDP deploy-
ments (Chrome, iOS) for gathering correlation statistics.
2. RELATED WORK
Differential Privacy (DP) [8, 11, 10], unlike its precursor privacy
definitions, provides semantic mathematical promises on individu-
als’ privacy, interpreted as statistical properties of the output distri-
bution of a randomized algorithm. Formally, an algorithmAmeets
the -DP guarantee if, over pairs of inputs D,D′ that differ in the
presence of a single individual, its output A(D) satisfies
Pr[A(D) = x]
Pr[A(D′) = x] ≤ exp(), (1)
where x is any permitted output. The model has risen in popularity
and adoption compared to earlier attempts to codify privacy (such
as k-anonymity and `-diversity [32, 24]), which can leak sensitive
information. It has been a topic of inquiry for diverse research com-
munities including theory [35], data management [25], machine
learning [33], and systems/programming languages [27]. We focus
on two directions: the emergent model of local differential privacy
(Section 2.1), and private marginal release (Section 2.2).
2.1 Local Differential Privacy (LDP)
Initial work on differential privacy assumed the participation of a
trusted aggregator, who curates the private information of individ-
uals, and releases information through a DP algorithm. In practice,
individuals may be reluctant to share private information with the
central data curator. Local differential privacy instead captures the
case when each user independently (but collaboratively) releases
information on their input through an instance of a DP algorithm.
This model was first suggested by Evfimievski et al. [15] under the
name of γ-amplification, with an application to mining association
rules. Duchi et al. [9] studied a generalization of that model as a
local version of DP, and proposed a minimax framework with in-
formation theoretic bounds on utility.
The canonical LDP algorithm is randomized response (RR), first
developed in the context of survey design in the 1960s [36]. Users
who possess a private bit of information flip it with some proba-
bility p to have plausible deniability of their response. Collecting
enough responses shared through this mechanism allows an accu-
rate estimate of the population behavior to be formed. Randomized
response is at the heart of many recent LDP algorithms, most fa-
mously Google’s deployment of RAPPOR [13], where RR is ap-
plied to a Bloom filter encoding a large set of possible URLs. In a
follow-up paper, Fanti et al. [16] extend RAPPOR’s ability to iden-
tify strings which are frequent across the user distribution, building
them up piece by piece. However, their solution is somewhat spe-
cific to RAPPOR’s case and does not offer any guarantee on the
accuracy.
There is a growing theoretical understanding of LDP. Kairouz et
al. [23, 22] study how to estimate the frequency of a single categor-
ical attribute, and propose optimal generalizations of randomized
response. Closest to our interest is work on generating a histogram
under LDP, or identifying the peaks in the input (heavy hitters).
This can be viewed as the problem of estimating a one-dimensional
marginal distribution. The state of art asymptotic lower bound and
matching algorithm are due to Bassily and Smith [4]. They adapt
ideas from dimensionality reduction (i.e. the Johnson-Lindenstrauss
lemma) to build a primitive to estimate the weight of a single point
in the distribution; this is used to find all heavy hitters. Qin et
al. adapt this approach to the related problem of identifying heavy
hitters within set valued data [31]. Most recently, Nguyeˆn et al.
describe a general approach for data analysis under LDP with mul-
tiple rounds [29]. They propose an orthogonal measurement basis
which is isomorphic to the Hadamard transform. However, it is
only used for one-dimensional data, rather than the multidimen-
sional data we consider.
2.2 Publishing Marginals Privately
Marginal tables arise in many places throughout data processing.
For example, an OLAP datacube is the collection of all possible
marginals of a data set. Consequently, there has been much work
to release individual marginals or collections of marginals under
privacy guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, these all assume
the trusted aggregator model. We discuss a representative set of
approaches, and whether they can be applied under LDP.
Laplace Noise. The baseline for differential privacy is the sensi-
tivity and noise approach: we bound (over all possible inputs) the
“sensitivity” of a target query in terms of the amount by which the
output can vary as a function of the input. Adding noise from an
appropriate distribution (typically Laplace) calibrated by the sen-
sitivity guarantees privacy. This approach transfers to LDP fairly
smoothly, since the sensitivity of a single marginal on N users is
easy to bound by O(1/N) [10]. A variant is to apply this release
to a transformation of the data, such as a wavelet or Fourier trans-
form [37, 3]. Our contribution in this work is to refine and analyze
the best way to release marginals via transformations under the re-
lated guarantee of LDP.
Subset Marginal Selection. When the objective is to release many
marginals — say, the entire data cube — the above approach shows
its limitations, since the sensitivity, and hence the scale of the noise
grows exponentially with the number of dimensions: 2d. Ding et
al. [7] suggest computing low dimensional marginals by selecting
a subset of high dimensional marginals that add the least amount
of noise by posing subset selection as a constrained optimization
problem and propose a greedy approximation. This solution does
not translate naturally to the local model, since each user has access
to only her record and may come up with a different subset locally
compared to others.
Multiplicative Weights. Several approaches use the multiplicative
weight update method to iteratively pick an output distribution [19,
20, 18]. For concreteness, we describe a non-adaptive approach due
to Hardt et al. [19]. The method initializes a candidate output uni-
form marginal, and repeatedly modifies it so that it is a better fit for
the data. To ensure DP, it uses the exponential mechanism [26] to
sample a k-way marginal whose projection at a certain point in the
true data is far from the corresponding value for the candidate. The
candidate is then scaled multiplicatively to reduce the discrepancy.
The sampling and rescaling step is repeated multiple times, and the
convergence properties are analyzed. The number of steps must be
limited, as the “privacy budget” must be spread out over all steps to
give an overall privacy guarantee. Applying the exponential mech-
anism in this way does not obviously extend to the LDP model.
In particular, every user’s single input is almost equally far from
any candidate distribution, so it is hard to coordinate the sampling
to ensure that the process converges. A natural implementation
would have many rounds of communication, whereas we focus on
solutions where each user generates a single output without further
coordination.
Chebyshev polynomials. Thaler et al. consider viewing a dataset
as a linear function on marginals, and represent each record of a
dataset via a γ-accurate Chebyshev polynomial [34]. Privacy is
achieved by perturbing their coefficients. The focus of the work
is to speed up compared to multiplicative weights solutions which
need to range over an O(2d)-sized representation of the data. This
approach could plausibly be adapted to LDP, although the steps
required are far from immediate.
In summary, the LDP requirement to perturb elements of every
single record independently (which are sparse in our case) while
preserving the underlying correlations is not yet met by prior work,
and so we must give new algorithms and analyses.
3. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In line with prior work [3], our main focus is on data represented
by binary variables. This helps to keep the notation uniform, and
highlights the key challenges. We discuss the modifications neces-
sary to accommodate more general attributes in Section 7.
In our setting, each user i has a has a private bit vector ji ∈
{0, 1}d that represents the values of the d (sensitive) attributes for
i. It is often more convenient to view the user’s data instead as an
indicator vector ti of length 2d with 1 at exactly one place ji and
0’s at remaining positions. The domain of all such ti’s is the set of
identity basis vectors I2d×2d . This ‘unary’ view of user data allows
us to model the full contingency table correspondingly as a vector
(histogram) of length 2d with each cell indexed by η ∈ {0, 1}d
storing the count of all individuals with that exact combination of
attribute values.
An untrusted aggregator (e.g. a pollster) is interested in gathering
information on these attributes from the population of users. Un-
der the LDP model, the aggregator is not allowed (on legal/ethical
grounds) to collect any user i’s records in plain form. The gath-
ered data should allow running queries (e.g. the fraction of users
that use product A,B but not C together) over the interaction of at
most k ≤ d attributes. We do not assume that there is a fixed set
of queries known a priori. Rather, we allow arbitrary such queries
to be posed over the collected data. Our goal is to allow the accu-
rate reconstruction of k-way marginal tables under LDP. We now
formalize Local Differential Privacy (Section 3.1), and introduce
examples and notation for computing marginals (Section 3.2).
3.1 Local Differential Privacy
Local differential privacy (LDP) requires each data owner to
perturb their output to meet the DP guarantee. Any two tuples
ti, t
′
i ∈ I2d×2d are considered adjacent, with ||ti − t′i||1 = 2
i.e. ti, t′i are adjacent if they differ in their positions of 1’s. LDP
upper bounds the ratio of probabilities of seeing the same outcome
for all adjacent tuples. The definition is obtained by applying the
differential privacy definition of equation (1) to a single user’s data.
DEFINITION 1 (-LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY (LDP) [9]).
A randomized mechanism F is differentially private with parame-
ter  iff for all pairs of adjacent input tuples ti, t′i ∈ I2d×2d , and
every possible output tuple R (k ≤ d), we have
Pr[F (ti) = R] ≤ e Pr[F (t′i) = R] (2)
Because LDP requires each individual input to be perturbed, it is
expected to incur more noise overall than “traditional” DP models
where a trusted aggregator receives unperturbed inputs. When we
aggregate in the LDP model, the above definition ensures that we
cannot confidently distinguish whetherR is an outcome of F (ti) or
F (t′i), yielding plausible deniability to user i. Note that under this
definition each user reveals their presence in the input. The model
allows each user to operate with a different privacy parameter, but
for simplicity we state our results using a value of  which is shared
by all users (in common with other work on LDP).
Basic Private Mechanisms. We describe primitives for LDP on
simple inputs, which form building blocks for our protocols.
Randomized Response (RR): We first formally define the classic
mechanism for releasing a single bit bi under privacy by having the
user lie with some probability [5]. In its simplest form, randomized
response has each user i report the true value of their input (bi) with
probability pr > 12 . Otherwise, i gives the opposite response (1−
bi). It is immediate that RR admits differential privacy with e =
pr
1−pr , by considering the probabilities of the four combinations of
input and output. Its simplicity has made it popular in practical
systems [13, 14, 29].
Budget Splitting (BS) and Randomized Response with Sampling
(RRS): When each user holds m pieces of information, a first ap-
proach is to release information about all m via a mechanism that
achieves (/m)-LDP on each, thus effectively splitting the “privacy
budget”  (BS). Standard composition results from the DP literature
ensure that BS meets -LDP [10]. However, in general, accuracy
is improved if we instead sample one out of m pieces of informa-
tion and release this with -LDP [4], and this is confirmed by our
analysis of our protocols. In particular, if a user’s information is
represented as a binary vector of dimension m, we can uniformly
sample an index j with probability ps = 1/m, and use Random-
ized Response with parameter pr to release the value found there.
Preferential Sampling (PS) and Parallel Randomized Response (PRR)
for sparse vectors: We often encounter cases where a user holds a
sparse vector: exactly one entry is 1, and the rest are 0. The random
sampling approach applied to the entries of the vector has the disad-
vantage that most likely we will sample a zero entry, limiting the in-
formation revealed. We discuss two alternative approaches, which
extend randomized response in different ways. The first extension
of RR is a natural generalization also proposed e.g. by [23], which
we call Preferential Sampling. Given a sparse vector t ∈ {0, 1}m
such that |t| = 1 and t[j] = 1, we sample an index ` according to
the following distribution:
` =
{
j : t[j] = 1, with probability ps
j′ : j′ ∈R [m] \ {j}, with probability 1− ps
In other words, we report the true index with probability ps, while
each incorrect index is reported with probability 1−ps
m−1 . Whenm =
2 this mechanism is equivalent to 1 bit randomized response. Con-
sidering these two output probabilities, we immediately have:
FACT 3.1. The index j reported by preferential sampling meets
LDP with e = ps
1−ps ·m− 1.
Rearranging, we set ps = (1 + (m− 1)e−)−1 to obtain -LDP.
A second approach is applym independent instances of RR, each
with parameter /2. We denote this as Parallel Randomized re-
sponse (PRR). Note that the output of PRR is anm-bit string which
is not guaranteed to be sparse.
FACT 3.2. Parallel Randomized Reponse applied to a sparse
vector t meets -LDP.
To see this, observe first that the probability of seeing any par-
ticular output string is the product of the probabilities for 
2
-RR
applied to each bit of ti in turn. Considering adjacent inputs ti and
t′i, and a particular outputR in (2), the probabilities associated with
all but two output bit locations in R are identical (and so cancel in
the ratio Pr[F (ti) = R]/Pr[F (t′i)] = R). We are left with the
probabilities associated with the locations ji and j′i (i.e. where the
1 bits in the two adjacent inputs are). The probability ratio for each
of these bits is exp(/2) from 
2
-RR, so their product is exp(), as
required by (2).
3.2 Marginal Tables
Notation and preliminaries. Recall that we model each user i’s bit
vector ti ∈ I2d×2d as a vertex in a d-dimensional Hamming cube.
Then we can restrict our attention only on a subset of k dimensions
of interest by summing (marginalizing) out cells of non-essential
dimensions. This is formally captured by the following definition.
DEFINITION 2 (MARGINAL OPERATOR). Given a vector t ∈
R2
d
, the marginal operator Cβ : R2d ⇒ R2k computes the summed
frequencies for all combinations of values of attributes encoded by
β ∈ {0, 1}d, where |β|, the number of 1s in β, is k ≤ d.
For example, for d = 4 and β = 0101 (which encodes our inter-
est in the second and the fourth attribute), the result of C0101(t) is
the projection of t on all possible combinations of the second and
fourth attributes with remaining attributes marginalized out. Each
of the 2k entries in the vector C0101(t) stores the total frequency of
combinations of the k attributes identified by β. We make use of
the  relation, defined as α  β iff α ∧ β = β. For convenience
of expression, we abuse notation and allow Cβ(t) to be indexed by
{0, 1}d rather than {0, 1}k, with the convention that entries α such
that α 6 β are 0. Under this indexing, the entries in a marginal can
be written in the following way:
∀γ  β Cβ(t)[γ] = ∑η:η∧β=γ t[η] (3)
The condition η ∧ β = γ selects all indices η ∈ {0, 1}d whose
value on attributes encoded by β are γ.
EXAMPLE 3.1. Let d = 4 and β = 0101. Then, applying (3):
C0101(t)[0000] = t[0000] + t[0010] + t[1000] + t[1010]
C0101(t)[0001] = t[0001] + t[0011] + t[1001] + t[1011]
C0101(t)[0100] = t[0100] + t[0110] + t[1100] + t[1110]
C0101(t)[0101] = t[0101] + t[0111] + t[1101] + t[1111]
All indices in {0, 1}d contribute exactly once to one entry inC0101.
DEFINITION 3 (k-WAY MARGINALS). We say that β identi-
fies a k-way marginal when |β| = k. For a fixed k, the set of all
k-way marginals correspond to all
(
d
k
)
distinct ways of picking k
attributes from d. We refer to the set of full k-way marginals as
encompassing all j-way marginals sets, ∀j ≤ k.
Note that the (unique) d-way marginal corresponds to the com-
plete input distribution. Since a single user’s input ti is sparse i.e.
contains just a single 1 (say at index ji), any marginal β of ti will
also be sparse with just one non-zero element. The relevant index
in Cβ(ti) is given by the bitwise operation ji ∧ β.
DEFINITION 4 (MARGINAL RELEASE PROBLEM). Given a set
of N users, our aim is to collect information (with an LDP guar-
antee) to allow an approximation of any k-way marginal β of the
full d-way distribution t =
∑N
i=1 ti/N . Let Ĉβ be the approximate
answer. We measure the quality of this in terms of the total variation
distance from the true answer Cβ(t), i.e.
1
2
∑
γβ |Ĉβ [γ]− Cβ(t)[γ]| = 12‖Ĉβ − Cβ(t)‖1
The marginals of contingency tables allow the study of interest-
ing correlations among attributes. Analysts are often interested in
marginals with relatively few attributes (known as low-dimensional
marginals). If we are only concerned with interactions of up to at
most k attributes, then it suffices to consider the k-way marginals,
rather than the full contingency table. Since during the data collec-
tion phase we do not know a priori which of the k-way marginals
may be of interest, our aggregation should gather enough informa-
tion from each user to evaluate the set of full k-way marginals for
some specified k. Our aim is to show that we can guarantee a small
total variation distance with at least constant probability1. We will
express our bounds on this error in terms of the relevant parameters
N , d, k, and the privacy parameter . To facilitate comparison, we
give results using the O˜ notation which suppresses factors logarith-
mic in these parameters.
Marginals and Basis Transforms. Since the inputs and marginals
of individual users are sparse, the information within them is con-
centrated in a few locations. A useful tool to handle sparsity and
“spread out” the information contained in sparse vectors is to trans-
form them to a different orthonormal basis. There are many well-
known transformations which offer different properties, e.g Taylor
expansions, Fourier Transforms, Wavelets, Chebyshev polynomi-
als, etc. Among these, the discrete Fourier transformation over
the Boolean hypercube—known as the Hadamard transform—has
many attractive features for our setting.
DEFINITION 5 (HADAMARD TRANSFORMATION (HT)). The
transform of vector t ∈ R2d is θ = φt where φ is the orthogonal,
symmetric 2d × 2d matrix where φi,j = 2−d/2(−1)〈i∧j〉.
Consequently, each row/column in φ consists of entries of the form
± 1
2d/2
, where the sign is determined by number of bit positions
that i, j agree on. It is straightforward to verify that any pair of
rows φi, φj satisfy 〈φi, φj〉 = 1 iff i = j, and the inner product
is 0 otherwise. Hence φ is an orthonormal basis for R2
d
. Given
an arbitrary vector t, we say that its representation under the HT is
given by the 2d Hadamard coefficients (denoted as θ) in the vector
θ = φt. These properties of HT are well-known due to its role in
the theory of Boolean functions [30]. In our case when ti has only
a single 1 (say at index `), the Hadamard transform of ti amounts
to selecting the `th basis vector of φ, and so θj = φj,`. We rely on
two elements to apply the Hadamard transform in our setting. The
first follows from the fact that the transform is linear:
LEMMA 1. φ(
∑n
i=1 ti/N) =
1
N
∑n
i=1(φti)
That is, the Hadamard coefficients for the whole population are
formed as the sum of the coefficients from each individual. The
second ingredient due to Barak et al. [3] is that we can write any
marginal β ∈ C as a sum of only a few Hadamard coefficients.
LEMMA 2 ([3]). Hadamard coefficients Hk = {θα : |α|≤k}
are sufficient to evaluate any k-way marginal β. Specifically,
Cβ(t)γ =
∑
αβ
〈φα, t〉
∑
η:η∧β=γ
φα,η =
∑
αβ
θα
( ∑
η:η∧β=γ
φα,η
)
(4)
Considering Example 3.1, to compute the marginal corresponding
to β = 0101, we just need the four Hadamard coefficients indexed
as θ0000, θ0001, θ0100 and θ0101. Moreover, to evaluate any 2-way
marginal from d = 4, we just need access to the
(
4
0
)
+
(
4
1
)
+
(
4
2
)
=
11 coefficients whose indices have at most 2 non-zero bits, out of
the 24 = 16 total coeffcients.
1All our methods allow the probability of larger error to be made
arbitrarily small.
4. PRIVATE MARGINAL RELEASE
We identify a number of different algorithmic design choices for
marginal release under LDP. By considering all combinations of
these choices, we reach a collection of six distinct baseline algo-
rithms, which we evaluate analytically and empirically, and iden-
tify some clear overall preferred approaches from our subsequent
study. We describe our algorithms in terms of two dimensions:
View of the data. The first dimension is to ask what view the al-
gorithm takes of the data. We are interested in marginals, so one
approach is to project the data out into the set of marginals of in-
terest, and release statistics about those marginals. However, since
any marginal can be obtained from the full input distribution by
aggregation, it is also possible to work with the data in this form.
How the information is released. The canonical way to release data
under LDP is to apply Randomized Response. As discussed in Sec-
tion 3.1, when the user’s data is represented as a sparse input vector,
we can instantiate this by sampling a cell in their table, and ap-
plying Randomized Response (the randomized response with sam-
pling, RRS, approach); by using a method such as preferential sam-
pling approach (PS); or parallel randomized response (PRR) to re-
port information on the vector. The alternative approach we study
is to apply the Hadamard transform: the user’s table is now rep-
resented by a collection of coefficients, each of which can take on
one of two possible values. We can then sample one Hadamard
coefficient, and report it via randomized response (we call this the
HT approach). Note that it is not meaningful to apply preferential
sampling or parallel RR after Hadamard transform, since the input
no longer meets the necessary sparsity assumption.
In order to analyze our algorithms, we make use of bounds from
statistical analysis, in particular (simplified forms of) the Bernstein
and Hoeffding inequalities:
DEFINITION 6 (BERNSTEIN AND HOEFFDING INEQUALITIES).
Given N independent variables Xi such that E[Xi] = 0, |Xi| <
Mi, and Var[Xi] = σ2 for all i. Then for any c > 0,
Pr
[ |∑Ni=1Xi|
N
> c
]
≤
2 exp(−
Nc2
2σ2+ 2c
3
maxiMi
) (Bernstein ineq.)
2 exp(− N2c2
2
∑N
i=1M
2
i
) (Hoeffding ineq.)
These two bounds are quite similar, but Bernstein makes greater
use of the knowledge of the variable distributions, and leads to
stronger bounds for us when we can show σ2 < M = maxiMi.
4.1 Accuracy Guarantees
In order to apply the above algorithms, we need to show that
the combination of techniques provides results which are unbiased,
accurate, and private. We now prove that these properties hold for
the baseline operators, and go on to show what results hold for each
method in turn. We first show how to obtain unbiased estimates for
quantities of interest from the privacy primitives. In each case, we
apply the primitive to estimate a parameter of the population f ,
such that 0 ≤ f ≤ 1, using N observations.
Unbiased estimator for Preferential Sampling. Recall that pref-
erential sampling reports an index ` which is claimed to be the lo-
cation of the sole 1 in the given input table of size 2k. For con-
venience, we write D = 2k − 1. Given the N reports, let Fj
be the fraction of times that j is reported, and let fj be the true
fraction of inputs that have a 1 at location j. Then the expected
reports of j come from the proportion of times the input is j and
it is correctly reported (psfj), plus the proportion of times the in-
put is not j but j is chosen to be reported ((1 − fj) 1−psD ). Thus
E[Fj ] = psfj + (1− ps) 1−fjD
Rearranging this provides an unbiased estimator, fˆj =
DFj+ps−1
Dps+ps−1 .
Unbiased estimator for Randomized Response methods. RRS
picks one out of m possible locations to report on and applies ran-
domized response. Using the same notation as above, let Fj be the
fraction of the reports that select index j which report a particular
output (say, +1). Recall the true value is reported with probability
pr , and the other answer with probability 1 − pr . With a similar
calculation to the above (which can be viewed as a special case of
PS when D = 1), we obtain an unbiased estimator fˆj =
Fj+pr−1
2pr−1 .
Following the corresponding calculation, the same estimator also
results for each bit position in PRR.
Unbiased estimator for Hadamard Transform. The HT approach
applies the Hadamard Transform to the user’s input. To achieve
LDP, we can use randomized response with parameter ph on a cho-
sen coefficient. Now let fj be the true unknown fraction of negative
values of coefficient j over the population. The expected observed
fraction of instances reported as negative, denoted Fj , is
E[Fj ] = −phfj − (1− fj)(1− ph) + (1− ph)fj + (1− fj)ph
= −4pfj − 1 + 2pr + 2fj .
Rearranging gives an unbiased estimator of the population frac-
tion of negative coefficients as fˆj =
1−2ph+Fj
2(1−2ph) . This gives an un-
biased estimate of the jth Hadamard coefficient θˆj as
θˆj = 2
− d
2 (1− 2fˆj) = 2− d2
(
1− 2
(
1−2ph+Fj
2(1−2ph)
))
= 2−
d
2
1−2ph−Fj−1+2ph
1−2ph = 2
− d
2
Fi
2ph−1 .
Master Theorem for Accuracy. To analyze the quality of the dif-
ferent algorithms, we provide a generalized analysis that can be
applied to several of our algorithms in turn. We assume that each
user input is in {−1, 1} in the proof, but we will also be able to
apply the theorem when inputs range over other values.
THEOREM 1. Let each ti be a sparse vector where one entry is
{−1, 1}, and the rest are zero. When each user i uniformly sam-
ples an input element j with probability ps and applies randomized
response with pr to construct t∗i , for c > 0 we have
Pr
[
|∑Ni=1 t∗i [j]− ti[j]|
N
≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2ps(2pr − 1)
2pr(2
1−pr
2pr−1 +
c
3
)
)
Intuitively, this theorem lets us easily express the (total varia-
tion) error in a marginal as a function of parameters ps and pr .
We will choose values of c that make this probability constant —
this implies (for example) that c should be chosen proportional to
1/
√
Nps. Hence, we capture how the error decreases as N in-
creases, and how it increases as the number of items being sampled
from increases. For ease of reading, we defer all lengthy proofs to
the Appendix.
4.2 Input Perturbation Based Methods
The three approaches which work directly on the input data re-
quire a two-step analysis: first we consider the accuracy of recon-
struction of some global information (e.g. the full distribution),
then we analyze the accuracy of aggregating this to give the re-
quired marginal β. Throughout we assume that 2d is at least O˜(N),
i.e. the number of users N participating is at least proportional to
the number of cells in the full distribution (2d). This is natural,
since it requires our methods which sample cells from the full in-
put to have at least constant probability of probing any given cell.
Now we spell out the details of our input perturbation based algo-
rithms.
Parallel Randomized Response On Input (INPRS). Each user i
perturbs their value ti at every index ` ∈ 2d using 2 -RR (PRR)
to obtain b∗i,` and releases the tuple 〈`, b∗i,`〉. We reconstruct a ver-
sion of the full input t∗ by simply summing all these contributions
(and dividing by N ); any desired marginal β is obtained by taking
Cβ(t∗), i.e. computing that marginal of the reconstructed input.
This is the most direct application of LDP to this problem, but may
not yield the best accuracy, due to the high amount of noise added
in 2d locations. It is also potentially costly to apply, since each user
needs to materialize and communicate 2d pieces of information.
Applying our general analysis allows us to bound the error (total
variation distance) in the returned marginal.
THEOREM 2. INPRS achieves -LDP and guarantees that
‖Cβ(t)− Cβ(t∗)‖1 = O˜
(
2(d+k)/2

√
N
)
with constant probability.
Preferential Sampling On Input (INPPS). As the name suggests,
instead of applying binary randomized response, each i in INPPS
samples the input signal index j with probability ps, then reports
the selected index to the aggregator. The reconstructed distribution
t∗ is found by averaging all these (unbiased) reports. As in the pre-
vious case, we can obtain any desired marginal by aggregating the
reconstructed distribution. Then we prove the following theorem.
THEOREM 3. INPPS achieves -LDP and guarantees that with
constant probability we have for a target k-way marginal β
‖Cβ(t)− Cβ(t∗)‖1 = O˜
(
2d+k/2

√
N
)
.
Consequently, we get a guarantee for INPPS in terms of total vari-
ation distance of O˜
(
2k/22d

√
N
)
. This exceeds the bound of the pre-
vious algorithm by a factor of 2d/2, so we expect the former to be
more accurate in practice.
Random Sampling Over Hadamard Coefficients (INPHT). In
this method, user i takes a randomly sampled coefficient j from
the HT of her input (i.e. φi[j]), and releases it via Randomized
Response. According to Lemma 2, we do not need to sample
from all coefficients; rather, we need only those coefficients re-
quired to reconstruct the k-way marginals. These are those coef-
ficients whose d-bit (binary) indices contain at most k 1’s. There
are T =
∑k
`=1
(
d
`
)
= O(dk) of these, which can be much smaller
than all 2d coefficients, or the 2d parameters needed to describe
the full input. The aggregator then builds an estimate for each co-
efficient as the average of the reported values, and uses these to
construct any target marginal β via the construction of Lemma 2 to
generate Cβ(t∗). We can apply Theorem 1 to this setting to obtain
a guarantee on the total variation distance between the correct and
reconstructed marginals.
THEOREM 4. INPHT achieves -LDP, and with constant prob-
ability we have for any target k-way marginal β
‖Cβ(t)− Cβ(t∗)‖1 = O˜
(
(2d)k/2

√
N
)
.
Comparing this to the previous results, we observe that the de-
pendence on 2k/2
/

√
N is the same. However, our full analysis
shows a dependence on
√
T in place of
√
2d. Recall that T =∑k
`=1
(
d
k
)
< 2d for k < d. For small values of k, this is much im-
proved. For example, for k = 2, T = O(d) in INPHT compared
to a 2d/2 term for INPRS. For completeness, in the appendix we
present Algorithms 1 and 2 to spell out the steps followed by user
and aggregator in INPHT.
4.3 Marginal Perturbation Based Methods
Our next methods are the analogs of the Input perturbation meth-
ods, applied to a randomly sampled marginal rather than the full
input. For brevity, we omit the formal proofs of these results and
instead provide the necessary intuition, since they are mostly adap-
tations of the previous proofs.
RR On A Random Marginal (MARGRS). In MARGRS, user i
samples a random marginal βi ∈ C, and then materializes all in-
dices ji from within that marginal, and perturbs each bi = Cβ(t)[ji]
using 
2
-RR (PRR). Let b∗i denotes the bit obtained after pertur-
bation at a particular location. The user then transmits the tuples
〈βi, ji, b∗i 〉 to the aggregator, who simply sums the returned values
and normalizes for each marginal.
Analysis. As with INPRS, it is immediate that the method achieves
-LDP, since only b∗i is specific to the input, and is obtained via
RR which is -LDP. In terms of accuracy, the analysis is also very
similar to INPRS. The difference is that we are now considering
sampling from
(
d
k
)
marginals, each of which contains 2k pieces
of information. So where before we had a dependence on 2d, the
method now also depends on 1/ps =
(
d
k
)
= O(dk). Thus, via
Theorem 2, we obtain a bound on the error in each entry of each
marginal of O˜(
√
dk
/

√
N). Summing this over the 2k entries in
the marginal, we obtain a total error of O˜
(
2kdk/2

√
N
)
.
PS On A Random Marginal (MARGPS). As an alternative ap-
proach to MARGRS, we can use preferential sampling (Section 3.1)
to try to pick the entry in the randomly sampled marginal which
contains the 1, instead of materializing each entry independently
using randomized response. For small marginals (i.e. small k), this
may be effective. Otherwise the algorithm is similar to MARGRS,
and we build all the required marginals by averaging together the
(unbiased) reported results from all participants.
Analysis. The behavior of this algorithm can be understood by
adapting the analysis of INPPS. Since we work directly with the
marginal of size k, we now obtain a bound in terms of 23k/2 where
before we had 2d+k/2. However, the effective population size is
split uniformly across the
(
d
k
)
different marginals. Consequently,
the total variation distance is O˜
(
23k/2dk/2

√
N
)
. This exceeds the
previous result by a factor of 2k/2, but for small k (such as k = 2
or k = 3), this can be treated as a constant and the other factors
hidden in the big-Oh notation may determine the true behavior.
Hadamard Transform Of A Random Marginal (MARGHT).
MARGHT also deviates from MARGRS only in how the chosen
marginal is materialized: it takes the Hadamard transform of each
user’s sampled marginal, and uses RR to release information about
a randomly chosen coefficient. These are aggregated to obtain esti-
mates of the (full) transform for each k-way marginal β. Note that
this method does not share information between marginals, and so
does not obtain as strong as result as INPHT.
Analysis. Here, pr is the same as in INPHT, but we are now sam-
pling over a larger set of possible coefficients: each marginal re-
quires 2k coefficients to materialize, and we sample across T =
O(dk) marginals. This sets ps = O((2d)−k). We obtain that
σ2 = O((2d)k/2) and M = O((2d)k/). Thus, we bound the
absolute error in each reconstructed coefficient by O˜
(
dk/2

√
N
)
, by
invoking Theorem 1 with these values and then applying the rescal-
ing by 2−k. We directly combine the 2k coefficients needed by
marginal β, giving total error O˜( 2
3k/2dk/2

√
N
), similar to the previ-
ous case.
Table 1: Attributes of NYC taxi dataset
Attribute Explanation
CC Has customer paid using credit card?
Toll Has customer paid toll?
Far Is journey distance ≥ 10 miles?
Night pick Is pickup time ≥ 8 PM?
Night drop Is drop off time ≤3 AM?
M pick Is trip origin within Manhattan?
M drop Is trip destination within Manhattan?
Tip Is tip paid ≥ 25% of the total fare?
Summary of marginal release methods. Although different in
form, all three marginal based methods achieve the same asymp-
totic error, which we state formally as follows:
LEMMA 3. Two marginal-based methods (MARGPS and MARGHT)
achieve -LDP and with constant probability the total variation dis-
tance between true and reconstructed k-way marginals is at most
O˜( 2
3k/2dk/2

√
N
). For MARGRS, the bound is O˜( 2
kdk/2

√
N
).
Comparing to the input based methods, a dependence on a factor
of 2
k/2

√
N
is common to all. Marginal-based methods multiply this
by a factor of at least (2d)k/2, while input based methods which
directly materialize the full marginal (INPRS and INPPS) have a
factor of 2d. The input Hadamard approach INPHT reduces this
to just dk/2. Asymptotically, we expect INPHT to have the best
performance. However, for the parameter regimes we are interested
in (e.g. k = 2), all these bounds could be close in practice. Hence,
we evaluate the methods empirically to augment these bounds.
4.4 Expectation-Maximization Heuristic
While materialization of marginals has not been the primary fo-
cus of prior work, a recent paper due to Fanti et al. does suggest an
alternative approach for the 2-way marginal case [16]. The cen-
tral idea is for each user to materialize information on all d at-
tributes, and to use post-processing on the observed combinations
of reported values to reach an estimate for a given marginal.
In more detail, each user independently perturbs each of the d
(binary) attributes via (/d)-randomized response, i.e. using Bud-
get Sharing (BS). To reconstruct a target marginal distribution, the
aggregator applies an instance of Expectation Maximization (EM).
Starting from an initial guess (typically, the uniform marginal), the
aggregator updates the guess in a sequence of iterations. Each it-
eration first computes the posterior distribution given the current
guess, applying knowledge of the randomized response mechanism
(expectation step). It then marginalizes this posterior using the ob-
served values of combinations of values reported by each user, to
obtain an updated guess (maximization step). These steps are re-
peated until the guess converges, which is then output as the es-
timated distribution. As noted by Bassily and Smith [4], this is a
plausible heuristic, but does not provide any worst case guarantees
of accuracy. We compare this method, denoted INPEM, to the al-
gorithms above in our experimental study. In summary, we find
that the method provides lower accuracy than our new methods.
In particular, we see many examples where it fails: the EM pro-
cedure immediately terminates after a single step and outputs the
prior (uniform) distribution.2. We compare INPEM with best of
our methods in section 5.4.
2Figure 9 in the Appendix quantifies this in more detail, and shows
some parameter settings where the method fails universally.
Figure 3: Heatmap of attribute correlation in NYC taxi dataset
5. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We have two goals for our empirical study: (1) to give exper-
imental confirmation of the accuracy bounds proved above; and
(2) to show that our algorithms support interesting machine learn-
ing/statistical tasks using our marginal computing machinery as
primitives. We implement our experiments using standard Python
packages (Numpy, Pandas) and perform tests on a standard Linux
laptop.
5.1 Experimental Setting
Datasets used. We use two different datasets for our experiments:
Movielens [21]. This dataset comprises over 20M records from
over 150K anonymous users who rate nearly 40K unique movie
titles. Each title belongs to one or more of 17 genres such as Action,
Comedy, Crime, Musical etc. From this, we derive a dataset that
resembles the “video viewing” example given in the Introduction.
We first find the top-1000 most rated movies in each genre. We
assign each user a vector of preferences ti ∈ {0, 1}d. For each
user i, a bit at index j ∈ [d] is 1 if i has rated at least one of the
top 1000 movies of genre j and zero otherwise. In this data, most
attribute pairs are postively correlated.
NYC Taxi Data [1]. This dataset samples trip records from all trips
completed in yellow taxis in NYC from 2013-16. Each trip record
can be viewed a unique anonymous cab driver’s response to a set of
survey questions about her journey. Some of the attributes are GPS
co-ordinates/timestamps of pick-up/drop-off, payment method, trip
distance, tip paid, toll paid, total fare etc. From this (very large)
data set, we select out the 3M records having pickup and/or drop-
off locations inside Manhattan. We obtain 8 binary attributes for
each trip, as detailed in Table 1. We observe in this dataset that most
journeys are short, and so attribute pairs such as pickup/drop-off
locations/times, tip-fraction and payment mode are strongly cor-
related. Meanwhile, most other attribute pairs are negatively cor-
related, or only weakly related. Figure 3 gives a heatmap for the
strength of pairwise associations using the Pearson coefficient.
Default Parameters And Settings. In each experimental instance,
we sample (with replacement) a set of random unique records/users
(50K ≤ N ≤ 0.5M ) as a power of 2 from the total available pop-
ulation. We vary  from 0.2 (higher privacy) to 1.4 (lower privacy).
Note that the theory shows that  and N are tightly related: de-
creasing meansN must be increased to obtain the same accuracy.
Some prior work on LDP e.g. [29] studies a smaller regime of 
values, at the expense of a much larger user population. We begin
our experimental study by sampling (without replacement) a small
subset of dimensions d (3-8), and increase to larger dimensionali-
ties for our later experiments. Per our motivation (Section 1), we
focus on small marginals (k = 1, 2, 3). We repeat each marginal
reconstruction 10 times to observe the consistency in our results,
and show error bars.
5.2 Impact of varying population size N
We aim to understand how much a privately reconstructed marginal
Cβ(t∗) deviates from its non-private counterpart Cβ(t) when β is
drawn from the set of k-way marginals. First, we fix  = 1.1 and
vary N for different choices of d, k. For our initial comparison, we
keep d’s moderate ({4, 8, 16}), as this suffices to distinguish the
methods which scale well from those that do not.
Experimental Setting. Figure 4 shows plots for total variation dis-
tance in reconstruction of k-way marginals as we vary N for all
combinations of k ∈ {1, 2, 3} and d ∈ {4, 8, 16} on the movie-
lens dataset with  = ln(3) ≈ 1.1 fixed throughout the experi-
ment. Each grid point shows the mean variational distance of all
k = 1, 2, 3 marginals. The values of parameters d and k vary
across the rows and columns of the figure, respectively.
Experimental Observations. The first high level behavior to ob-
serve across the board is reduction in error with increase of N for
all 6 algorithms. This agrees with the analysis that error should be
proportional to 1/
√
N , i.e. error halves as population quadruples.
We also see an increase in error along columns (rows) as k (d) in-
creases, although the dependency varies for different algorithms.
Our second observation is that the performance of INPPS decays
rapidly as a function of d, consistent with the accuracy bound of
2d. Typically, INPPS’s error does not reduce as with N . This is
because the probability of outputting the signal index becomes so
small for larger d’s that each user responds with a random index
most of the time. This means that the perturbed input distribu-
tion does not contain much information for our estimators to invert
the added noise with precision. One surrogate for the accuracy of
the algorithms is the number of statistics materialized in each case.
For d = 8, k = 2, INPPS construct 28 = 256 values, while the
marginal-based methods are working on
(
8
2
)×2k = 112 values. As
a result, the number of data points per cell is proportionately more
for MARGHT, MARGPS thus improving their accuracy. On the
other hand, the input-based method INPHT convincingly achieves
the lowest (or near lowest) error across all parameter settings.
Breaking the algorithms down by the cardinality of the marginal
(k), note that for k = 1 then the primitives RR and PS are effec-
tively the same. Further, for a given marginal, there is only one
meaningful Hadamard coefficient needed, and so we expect the
Hadamard-based methods to behave similarly. Indeed, the meth-
ods MARGPS, MARGRS, MARGHT, and INPHT are largely in-
distinguishable in their accuracy. For the larger 2-way and 3-way
marginals, we see more variation in behavior. The input-based
methods do not fare well: INPPS has very large errors for even
smaller d values (d = 4 and d = 8), and INPRS is similar once
d = 16. We observe that MARGPS achieves better accuracy than
MARGRS. This supports the idea that the former method, which
preferentially reports the location of each user’s input value, can
do better than naive randomized response, even though this is not
apparent from the asymptotic bounds. Interestingly, on this data we
see that the difference in performance of MARGPS and MARGHT
is tiny, and MARGPS turns out to be a better algorithm. For d =
16, MARGHT starts as a better algorithm but is outperformed by
MARGPS. is small compared to d with increase in N .
INPRS is among the better methods for smaller values of d and
k’s. However, we advise against INPRS for large d’s since it takes
time proportional to 2d to perturb all cells of each user. Similarly,
the use of MARGRS is also hard to justify from an execution time
Figure 4: Mean total variation distance for 1, 2, 3−way marginals over the movielens dataset as N varies
standpoint when k gets larger, since it materializes the full marginal
and applies randomized response to each cell.
Across all experiments, we conclude that INPHT appears to achieve
the best accuracy most consistently, and is very fast in practice.
5.3 Impact of privacy parameter 
Experimental Setting. Next, we fixN to 218 ≈ 0.25M movielens
users (sampled with replacement) and change . As before, we
increase d (resp., k) along columns (rows) and vary 0.4 ≤  ≤ 1.4
to see the effect on utility in Figure 5.
Observations: We observe a decline in error as we increase the
privacy budget . Once again we see that INPPS, INPRS, MAR-
GRS become unfavorable for k ≥ 2. MARGPS’s accuracy gets
better than MARGHT with increase in , although MARGHT is
preferable to MARGPS for small  values when d and k are larger.
Yet again, INPHT consistently outperforms all other algorithms
across all configurations. The main takeaway from these experi-
ments is the confirmation that the algorithms with the best theoret-
ical bounds on performance are borne out to be the best in practice.
In general, INPHT is our first preference followed by MARGPS
and MARGHT.
5.4 Impact of increasing dimensionality d
Now that we have established the relative performance of our
algorithms, we compare to an alternative method that works in the
case k = 2, denoted INPEM (Section 4.4). We consider a larger
range of values of the dimensionality d, (achieved by duplicating
columns) and show the results in Figure 6. For INPEM, we fix the
convergence threshold to Ω = 0.00001, i.e. stop when the change
in the current guess is below Ω.
Experimental observations. We see that the INPEM gives reason-
able results that improve as  is increased. However, the achieved
accuracy is several times worse than the unbiased estimators IN-
PHT and MARGPS. There are additional reasons to not prefer IN-
PEM: it lacks any accuracy guarantee, and so is hard to predict
results. It is also slow to apply, taking several thousand or tens
of thousands of iterations to converge. In some cases, the con-
vergance criteria are immediately met by the uniform distribution,
which is far from the true marginal. We omit formal timing results
for brevity; however, convergence time was observed to grow lin-
early with d. Weakening the convergence criterion (i.e. increasing
the stopping parameter Ω) even slightly led to much worse accu-
racy results than the alternative methods. In contrast, our unbiased
estimators are found instantaneously.
Remark. It is reasonable to ask whether EM decoding schemes
can be developed for other methods for recovering marginals. We
performed a set of experiments on this approach (details omitted
for space reasons); our conclusion is that while this can be applied
to our algorithms, there is no improvement compared to the direct
construction of unbiased estimators.
6. APPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
Since each cell of a k-way marginal is a joint distribution of a set
of k attributes and can be used to determine conditional probabili-
ties, marginals are useful in machine learning and inference tasks.
In this section, following our motivational use case, we perform (1)
Figure 5: Mean total variation for 1, 2, 3−way marginals for N = 256K movielens users as  varies.
association testing among attributes (2) dependency trees fitting.
For both tasks, 1 and 2-way marginals are sufficient. Based on the
accuracy results, we use MARGPS and INPHT for these tasks. Fi-
nally, we discuss how to apply our results to non-binary attributes.
6.1 Association Testing
We often want to check if two variables A,B are independent
or not i.e. we want to know if Pr[A,B] ≈ Pr[A] Pr[B]. The χ2
test of independence compares the observed cell counts to expected
counts assuming the independence (null hypothesis) and compute
the χ2 value (see e.g. [2]). It then compares this value to the critical
value p for a given confidence interval (usually 0.95). If χ2 > p,
we conclude that A,B are dependent (rejecting the null hypothe-
sis). For a 2-way marginalm, theχ2 statistic is
∑
j∈{0,1}2
(t[j]−E[t[j]])2
E[t[j]] ,
where E[t[j]] is the expected value at t[j].
Experimental setting. We use the taxi data for supporting this
task since this dataset has a good mix of correlated/weakly corre-
lated attributes (Figure 3). As mentioned above, there are strong
positive associations in the taxi data among the pairs 〈Night pick,
Night drop〉, 〈Toll, Far〉 and 〈CC, Tip〉 and expect the test to de-
clare them as dependent. Similarly, we expect the test to declare
the pairs 〈M drop, CC〉, 〈Far, Night pick〉 and 〈Toll, Night pick〉
to be independent.
Experimental observations. Figure 7 compares privately and non-
privately computed χ2 values with the critical value (computed
with 1 degree of freedom and with confidence interval of 95%3)
over log scale. We observe that non-private and private χ2 values
are quite close in most cases for INPHT (note the log scale on the
y-axis, which tends to exaggerate errors in small quantities). On
the other hand, MARGPS often commits the type I error (thus fail-
ing to reject the null hypothesis) for the pairs 〈Toll, Night pick〉,
〈Far, Night pick〉 and occasionally for pairs 〈M drop , CC〉, since
the test statistic is close to the critical value in these cases.
6.2 Bayesian Modeling
Exact estimation of a joint distribution for d discrete variables
could be computationally infeasible for large d’s. Chow and Liu in
[6] proposed an algorithm for approximating a joint distribution of
a set of discrete variables using products of distributions involving
no more than pairs of variables. Since each variable in the approx-
imation depends on at most one more variable, the task of finding
such approximation can be thought as finding a tree that optimizes a
particular distance metric. They prove that a tree configuration that
maximizes total mutual information among edges is an optimal ap-
proximation of the joint distribution in question. This insight con-
verts the intractable optimization problem of finding such tree to
an easy problem of finding a maximum weight spanning tree. Con-
cretely, all we have to do is treat all random variables as nodes in an
3Gaboardi et al. in [17] suggest increasing p since comparing a
differentially private χ2 statistic to a noise unaware critical value
may not lead to a good significance level even for large N . We
do not perform correction in this test, and leave developing robust
correlation tests under LDP for future work.
Figure 6: Total variation distance for k = 2 on NYC Taxi Trips Data For larger d’s. We observe that our best algorithms outperform
Fanti et al.’s (INPEM) algorithm for small  values.
Figure 7: χ2 test values on N = 256K NYC taxi trips,  = 1.1.
Figure 8: Total mutual information of trees on movielens
empty graph and find a tree that maximizes the total edge weight.
Once a tree is learnt, any high dimensional joint distribution of in-
terest can be learnt by multiplying conditional probabilities that can
found using marginals.
The center piece of this algorithm is computation of mutual in-
formation between
(
d
2
)
pairs of variables. Mutual information be-
tween two discrete variables A,B ∈ {0, 1} is given as
MI(A,B) =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}2 Pr[A = i, B = j] log
Pr[A=i,B=j]
Pr[A=i] Pr[B=j]
Experimental setting. Note that the Chow-Liu algorithm finds a
tree from the equivalence class of trees fitting the given data and
are not unique. Moreover, there could be many others trees with
different topologies achieving near optimal MI score. Therefore,
our aim in this section is to compare total MI from privately and
non-privately learnt trees. For this purpose, we use the movielens
dataset with d = 10.
Experimental observations. Figure 8 compares the total (true) MI
from 200K users for various  values (error bars show variation
over different subsets of sampled records). We once again see that
MI of trees computed with INPHT marginals is nearly the same
as the non-private computation. MARGPS is less accurate at low
’s but catches up with INPHT as  increases. We conclude that
INPHT gives a robust solution for this approach.
6.3 Categoric Attributes
We now consider how to apply these methods over more general
classes of input – in particular, over cases where the input is non-
binary, but ranges over a larger set of possible categories r > 2.
Suppose now we have d categoric attributes with cardinalities (in-
dexed in order of size for convenience) r1 ≥ r2 ≥ . . . ≥ rd, and
wish to find marginals involving subsets of at most k attributes. We
describe two approaches to handling such data.
Binary encoding methods using our algorithms. Many of our
algorithms such MARGRS, MARGPS, INPPS, INPRS will gener-
alize easily in this case, since they can be applied to users rep-
resented as sparse binary vectors. The Hadamard-based methods
MARGHT and INPHT can also be generalized if we rewrite the in-
put in a binary format, i.e. we create a fresh binary attribute for
each possible categoric value in an attribute (aka “one-hot encod-
ing”). However, we can more compactly encode an attribute value
that takes on r possible values using dlog2 re bits, and consider
this as the conjunction of dlog2 re binary attributes. Consequently,
we state a result (based on our strongest algorithm for the binary
case) in terms of the effective binary dimension of the encoded
data, d2 =
∑d
i=1dlog2 rie; and the binary dimension of k-way
marginals k2 =
∑k
i=1dlog2 rie:
COROLLARY 1. Using INPHT on binary encoded data, we achieve
-LDP, and with constant probability we have for any target k-way
marginal β on binary encoded data,
‖Cβ(t)− Cβ(t∗)‖1 = O˜
(
(2d2)
k2/2

√
N
)
Consequently, this provides an effective solution, particularly for
data with low cardinality attributes.
Orthogonal Decomposition. It is natural to ask whether there are
alternative decompositions for categorical data which share many
of the properties of the Hadamard transform (orthogonal, requir-
ing few coefficients to reconstruct low-order marginals). One such
approach is the Efron-Stein decomposition [12] which is a general-
ization of Hadamard transform for non binary contingency tables.
Similar to HT, it is possible to extract a set of Efron-Stein coef-
ficients necessary and sufficient to evaluate a full set of a k−way
marginals. One could then design an algorithm similar to INPHT
that adds noise to a random coefficient, allowing an unbiased es-
timate to be constructed by an aggregator. We conjecture that for
low order marginals, a scheme based on such decomposition will
be among the best solutions.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided algorithms and results for the central problem
of private release of marginal statistics on populations. Our main
conclusion is that methods based on Fourier (Hadamard) transfor-
mations of the input are effective for this task, and have strong theo-
retical guarantees. Although the technical analysis is somewhat in-
volved, the algorithms are quite simple to implement and so would
be suitable for inclusion in current LDP deployments in browsers
and mobile devices: it would require only small modifications to
RAPPOR or iOS to incorporate them.
Algorithm 1 INPHT– User Routine
1: procedure INPHT(ti)
2: Let ji be the signal index of ti.
3: Randomly sample a coefficient index `i ∈ Hk.
4: hi ← (−1〈ji∧`i〉) . Compute (scaled up) θ`i
5: t∗i ← RR(hi[ji]) . Apply randomized response
6: Return (t∗i , ji)
7: end procedure
APPENDIX
Algorithm 2 Aggregator’s routine for INPHT
1: T ∗[0] = 1 . 0th Hadamard coefficient is always 1.
2: Aggregator populates (t∗i , `i) from all users in array T
∗ ∈ R|Hk|.
3: for all j ∈ Hk do
4: T ∗[j]←
∑N
i=1 T
∗
i [j]
Nj(2p−1) . . Nj is the frequency count of index
j.
5: end for
6: Use Lemma 2 on T ∗ to evaluate any ≤ k−way marginal.
A. DEFERRED PROOFS
In this appendix, we provide the detailed technical proofs for the
claimed privacy and accuracy properties of our algorithms. Note
that while the proofs are somewhat involved, the algorithms them-
selves are fairly straightforward to implement. By way of example,
in Algorithms 1 and 2 we show the procedure followed for user
and aggregator for the INPHT approach, which is perhaps the most
involved. The user’s work is straightforward, as they just have to
sample a coefficient from the set of relevant coefficients Hk, and
apply randomized response. The aggregator tallies these responses,
applies bias correction and normalizes, then treats these as if they
were the exact coefficients to evaluate any marginal with (following
the equation stated in Lemma 2).
PROOF PROOF OF THEOREM 1. We first consider the input of
a single user subject to randomized response, and obtain an un-
biased estimate for their contribution to the population statistics.
This lets us combine the estimates from each user to compute an
unbiased estimate for the population, whose variance we analyze
to bound the overall error.
Let ti[j] ∈ {−1, 1} be i’s unknown true input at location j and
t∗i [j] be the unbiased estimate of ti[j]. First, we derive the values
we should ascribe to t∗ to ensure unbiasedness, i.e. E[t∗i [j]] = ti[j].
1. When j is sampled (with probability ps) and ti[j] = 1, we set
t∗i [j] = x/ps with probability pr and t
∗
i [j] = y/ps otherwise.
2. When j is sampled (with probability ps), and ti[j] = −1, we set
t∗i [j] = y/ps with probability pr and x/ps otherwise.
3. When j is not sampled, we implicitly set t∗i [j] = 0.
We can encode these conditions with linear equations:
prx+ (1− pr)y = −1 (5)
pry + (1− pr)x = 1 (6)
Solving, we obtain x = 1
(2pr−1) and y = − 1(2pr−1) .As we require
pr >
1
2
, we have x > 0 and y = −x < 0. We now analyze
the (squared) error from using these parameters. Define a random
variable for the observed error as Yi[j] = t∗i [j] − ti[j]. Observe
that E[Yi[j]] is 0, and
|Yi[j]| ≤ 1
ps
(
1 +
1
2pr − 1
)
=
2pr
ps(2pr − 1) := M.
Furthermore, |Yi[j]| is symmetric whether ti[j] = 1 or −1. Then:
Var[Yi[j]] = E[Y
2
i [j]]
=
prps
p2s
∣∣ 1
2pr − 1 − 1
∣∣2 + (1− pr)ps
p2s
∣∣1 + 1
2pr − 1
∣∣2 + (1− ps)12
≤ pr
ps
(
2pr − 2
2pr − 1
)2
+
(1− pr)
ps
(
2pr
2pr − 1
)2
+ (1− ps)
=
4
ps(2pr − 1)2 (pr(1− pr)
2 + (1− pr)p2r) + (1− ps)
=
4pr(1− pr)
ps(2pr − 1)2 + (1− ps) := σ
2. (7)
Now we consider the effect of aggregating N estimates of the
j’th population parameter. Using Bernstein’s inequality (Defini-
tion 6), we can bound the probability of the error being large based
on the bound M on the absolute value of the Yi[j]’s.
Pr
[
|∑Ni=1 Yi[j]|
N
≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
2σ2 + 2cM
3
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
2( pr(1−pr)
ps(2pr−1)2 + 1) +
2cpr
3ps(2pr−1)
)
= 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
2pr
ps(2pr−1) (
2(1−pr)
(2pr−1) +
c
3
) + 2
)
(8)
This provides us with the statement of the theorem.
PROOF PROOF OF THEOREM 2. We first analyze the accuracy
with which each entry of the full marginal t[j] is reconstructed,
then combine these to obtain the overall result. Consider an arbi-
trary index j ∈ 2d, since INPRS is symmetric across all indices.
To achieve -LDP, we set pr = e
/2
1+e/2
, and ps = 1. For the pur-
pose of analysis only, we reduce the problem so that we can apply
Theorem 1, by applying a remapping from {0, 1} to {−1, 1}: we
replace ti[j] with t′i[j] = 2ti[j] − 1. Observe that the absolute
error in reconstructing t′i[j] is only a constant factor of that in re-
constructing t′i[j]. Writing α = e
/2, then we have the variance of
the local errors Yi[j] = (ti[j]− t∗i [j]) is (substituting these values
of pr and ps into (7)):
Var[Yi[j]] ≤ 4pr(1− pr)
(2pr − 1)2 + 1− 1 = 4
( 1
1+α
)(1− 1
1+α
)
( 2
1+α
− 1)2
= 4
α
(1+α)2
( 1−α
1+α
)2
=
4α
(1− α)2 =
4e/2
(e/2 − 1)2 .
The reconstruction of the full input distribution is t∗ =
∑N
i=1 t
∗
i /N .
We can make use of the inequalities 1
e/2−1 ≤ 1 and 1 < e/2 < 4
for 0 <  < 2 to bound the variance and substitute into (8).
Pr[|tj − t∗j | > c] ≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
2 · (4 8
2
) + 2·8c
3
)
Setting c to 9N−1/2 1

√
log 2d+1/δ bounds this probability to
2 exp
(
− 81
1
2
log 2d+1/δ
32
2
+ 16
3
9
2
√
2d log 2d+1/δ
N
)
<2 exp
(
− 81 log(2
d+1/δ)
32 + 48
)
≤ δ/2d
This ensures that this error probability is less than δ/2d for any
index j. This limits the error in each of the 2d estimates to being
O˜( 1

√
1
N
), by applying a union bound.
We construct the target marginal β via the marginal operator, so
Ĉβ = Cβ(t∗). Each entry t∗[j] is an unbiased estimator for t[j]
whose absolute value is bounded by c with probability 1− δ. Con-
ditioning on this event, we compute Ĉβ [γ] = ∑αγ t∗[α], sum-
ming over the 2d−k values of α  γ. The error in this quantity
is then at most O˜(c
√
2d−k), applying a Hoeffding bound (Defini-
tion 6). Finally, summing the absolute errors over all 2k entries γ
in the target marginal β, we have probability at least 1− δ that the
total variation distance is O˜( 2
k2(d−k)/2

√
N
) = O˜( 2
(d+k)/2

√
N
).
PROOF PROOF OF THEOREM 3. Similar to Theorem 1, we de-
fine random variables Yi[j] which describe the error in the estimate
from user i at position j. The proof is a bit more complicated here,
since these variables are not symmetric. Consider user i who sam-
ples a location under PS, such that the correct location is sampled
with probability ps, and each of theD = 2d−1 incorrect locations
is sampled with probability (1− ps)/D. Following the analysis in
Section 4.1, we report D+ps−1
Dps+ps−1 for the location which is sampled,
and ps−1
Dps+ps−1 for those which are not sampled. For convenience,
define the quantity ∆ = Dps + ps − 1. The choice of ps (which
depends on D and ) ensures that ∆ > 0. There are two cases that
arise:
(i) ti[j] = 1. With probability ps, location j is sampled. The
contribution to the error at this location is
D+ps−1
∆
− 1 = 1
∆
(D + ps − 1−Dps − ps + 1) = D∆ (1− ps).
Else, with probability 1− ps, j is not sampled, generating error
ps−1
∆
− 1 = ps−1−Dps−ps+1
∆
= D
∆
ps for |t∗i [j] = ti[j]|.
(ii) ti[j] = 0. With probability 1−psD , we sample this j, giving error
D+ps−1
∆
− 0. Otherwise, the contribution to the error is ps−1
∆
.
We define a random variable Yi[j], which is the error resulting
from user i in their estimate of ti[j]. Note that an upper bound M
on Yi[j] isD/∆. We compute bounds on Y 2i , conditioned on ti[j].
E[Yi[j]
2|ti[j] =1] = ps
(D
∆
(1− ps)
)2
+ (1− ps)
(
ps
D
∆
)2
= ps(1− ps)
(D
∆
)2
≤ (1− ps)D
2
∆2
E[Yi[j]
2|ti[j] =0] = 1− ps
D
(
D + ps − 1
∆
)2
+
(
1− 1− ps
D
)(
ps − 1
∆
)2
=
1− ps
∆2
(
1
D
(D + ps − 1)2 + D + ps − 1
D
(1− ps)
)
=
1− ps
D∆2
(D + ps − 1)(D + ps − 1 + 1− ps)
= (1− ps)(D + ps − 1)/∆2 ≤ (1− ps)D/∆2
To bound the error in t∗[j], we make use of the (unknown) pa-
rameter fj , the proportion of users for whom ti[j] = 1. We subse-
quently remove the dependence on this quantity. We now write
E[Yi[j]
2] ≤ (1− ps) D
∆2
(fjD + (1− fj)) := σ2j
Using this in the Bernstein inequality (Definition 6), we obtain
Pr
[
|∑Ni=1 Yi[j]|
N
≥cj
]
≤ 2 exp
(
−Nc2j
/(
2σ2j +
2cjM
3
))
= 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
j
2(1− ps) D∆2 (fjD + (1− fj)) +
2cjD
3∆
)
If we write Ψj =
√
fjD + 1− fj , then setting cj =
√
3D ln(2/δ)
∆
√
N
Ψj
is sufficient to ensure that this probability is at most δ.When we ap-
ply the marginal operator Cβ to the reconstructed input t∗, each
of the 2k entries is formed by summing up (D + 1)/2k (unbi-
ased) entries of t∗. Write f ′γ =
∑
j∧β=γ fj , and define Ψ
′
γ cor-
respondingly as
√
f ′γ(D − 1) + D+12k . Applying the Hoeffding
bound (Definition 6), we obtain that each Cβ(t∗)[γ] has error at
most
√
3D ln(2/δ)
∆
√
N
Ψ′γ with probability at least 1− δ.
We can now sum the error across all (D+1)/2k indices γ. First,∑
γβ
ψ′γ =
∑
γβ
(f ′γ(D − 1) + D + 1
2k
)
1
2
≤
√
2k
(∑
γβ
f ′γ(D − 1) + D + 1
2k
) 1
2
=
√
2k+1 ·D
where the inequality is due to Cauchy-Schwarz, and we use that
the f ′γs are a probability distribution, and sum to 1. Then we have
a bound on the total variational error error of marginal construction
by summing over all indices γ as∑
γβ
c′γ
2
=
1
2∆
√
D
N
√
3 ln 2/δ
∑
γβ
Ψ′γ ≤ 2
k/2D
∆
√
N
√
3
2
ln 2/δ
We next simplify the term D/∆ as follows. Recall that theory sets
ps = (1 +De
−)−1. Then
D
∆
=
D
(D + 1)/(1 +De−)− 1 =
D(1 +De−)
D + 1− 1−De−
=
1 +De−
1− e− =
1
1− e− +
D
e − 1
When D is very small, in particular when D = 1, this reduces
to a similar error as for the RR case. Assuming that  is at most a
constant (say, 8), we can upper bound this expression by O(D+1

).
Hence, the total variational error is bounded by O˜( 2
k/2(D+1)

√
N
).
PROOF PROOF OF THEOREM 4. The proof proceeds along the
same lines as for Theorem 2. We set pr = e/(1 + e) to ensure
that INPHT meets -LDP. Recall that, from Lemma 1, our aim is to
compute Hadamard coefficients as the normalized sum of the coef-
ficients from each user. To apply the Master theorem (Theorem 1),
we first multiply up each coefficient by the 2d/2 factor from the
Hadamard coefficients θ (Definition 5). Since each user’s input
vector has only a single 1 entry, this ensures that each θi[j] is either
−1 or +1. Now the θi and θ∗i s represent the T necessary and suffi-
cient (scaled up) Hadamard coefficients, and so we set ps = 1/T .
We write the variance of the errors in these estimates Yi[j], and
obtain
Var[Yi[j]] = 4T
pr(1− pr)
(2pr − 1)2 + 1 =
4Te
(e − 1)2 + 1 = O(T/
2)
Substituting this variance bound into (8), we obtain
Pr
[ |∑Ni=1 Yi[j]|
N
≥ c
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− Nc
2
O(T/2 + Tc

)
)
Setting c proportional to N−1/2 1

√
T · log T/δ ensures that this
probability is at most δ/T for any given Hadamard coefficient j
N d k  Failed/Total Marginals
216 8 1 0.2 3/8
218 8 2 0.1 15/28
216 8 2 0.2 3/28
216 12 2 0.2 19/66
218 16 2 0.1 120/120
218 16 2 0.2 72/120
219 24 2 0.2 276/276
Figure 9: Failure rate for INPEM on NYC taxi data for small 
values
.
(again using that N is large enough). This bound then holds for all
T with probability 1− δ, using the union bound.
In order to translate this into a bound on the accuracy of recon-
structing a marginal, we make use of Lemma 2, that the marginal
can be expressed in terms of a linear sum of Hadamard coefficients.
Adapting (4), we have that∑
γβ
|Cβ [γ]− Ĉβ [γ]| ≤
∑
γβ
∣∣∑
αβ
(θα − θˆα)
∑
η∧β=γ
φα,η
∣∣
To bound this quantity, we observe that:
(i) There are 2k such γ  β to consider.
(ii) There are similarly 2k such α to consider, and the above anal-
ysis bounds (θα − θˆα) ≤ c/2d/2, once we rescale the coeffi-
cients back down. Since the θˆα are unbiased estimators bounded
by c2−d/2, by the Hoeffding inequality, we have that the sum of 2k
of these is at most 2k/2−d/2c with probability at least 1− δ.
(iii) Given γ  β, there are 2d−k such η to consider, and so we
have |∑η∧β=γ φα,η| ≤ 2d−k2−d/2 = 2d/2−k.
Then the total variational error is (multiplying these three quanti-
ties together) 2k2k/2−d/2c2d/2−k = c2k/2 = O˜
(
2k/2
√
T

√
N
)
.
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